Unfortunately the comparative advantages of the
property tax depend upon the strength of the relationship between tax payments
and real property values. Where the linkage is strong, the tax does a really
nice job of matching local tax burdens to the benefits that result from local
public spending. Where this relationship is severed, the tax is neither fair
nor efficient. Once upon a time, or so the City Club of Portland claims, Oregon
had a property tax system that was the envy of the world, but as the result of
a series of initiatives and referenda (Measures 5, 47, and 50), it is now a
mere shadow of its former self. Is this claim correct? As will be seen, not
entirely.
What Measure 5 did was cap property tax bills at 1.5
percent of market value (RMV) and reform the assessment process so that
assessments accurately reflected market value. (The measure also shifted
responsibility for school funding from local government to the state, but that
is another story.) Measure 5 was enacted in 1990 and was scheduled to be fully
operational in the 1995-96 tax year. Measure 50 was enacted in 1997,. It rolled
residential tax assessments back to whichever was less: the last pre-Measure 5
assessment, that of 1994–95, or 90% of the 1995–96 assessment and limited
future increases in tax assessments, except for new construction or additions,
to 3 percent per year. We call this quantity ‘Measure 50 assessed value’
(M50AV); it is currently ≤175 percent of 1995 market value, which is on average
about 60 percent of current market value. The actual assessment used for tax
purposes (TAV) is the lessor of M50 and RMV. Currently the average statutory
property tax rate in the state is about 2.2 percent. Consequently, Measure 5
limits are binding only where the ratio of M50AV/RMV is greater than 65
percent.
This is a pretty complicated arrangement and it has obviously
attenuated the linkage between local property values and tax burdens (under
Measure 5), but like most things the relevant questions are how much and
compared to what? Fortunately, every exit is an entrance somewhere else.
Oregon’s idiosyncratic property-tax arrangements have left us an extremely
accurate system of measuring property values (RMV), a system of assessment that
has held relative values constant for 17 years (M50AV), and a cap on property
tax bills. These data allow us to answer several important questions: how good
are current assessments, why aren’t they better, how fast do assessments
degrade in the absence of reassessment and what drives this process?
Moreover, when measure 50 was enacted, it is unlikely
that anyone thought about how it would operate in a recessionary environment. Although
Oregon’s economy went through a deep slump from 2002-2004, housing inflation
continued, steadily widening the gap between M50AV and RMV. But, as in much of
the rest of the United States, home prices fell sharply after 2007. This had
two effects. It narrowed the gap between M50AV and RMV, but, more importantly,
it made Measure 5 limits binding on an increasing portion of homes. At present,
Measure 5 limits go into effect when M50AV > 65 percent of TMV. The same
data that allow us to understand the dispersion of MAV with respect to TMV over
time and the direction and bias associated those measures, also allows us to
assess the relationship between market valuation and tax payments over time and
from the peak to the trough of the business cycle under Oregon’s property tax
system.
Finally, these data would allow us to simulate the
effects on dispersion and tax fairness of various policy modifications,
including most importantly reassessment to RMV at title transfer, but of other
policies as well, although we haven’t done that.
Looking at these data the first thing we learn is
that most of the discrepancies between M50AV and RMV were present at the
creation. Rolling assessments back to 1994-5 wiped out the gains in assessment uniformity
from the more accurate methods mandated by Measure 5, as well as the
capitalized increases in market values that Measure 5 triggered. As a result,
the discrepancies we see now in TAR/RMV ratios from residence to residence
largely reflect discrepancies that existed prior to the implementation of
Measure 5. The figure to the right shows average assessment ratios by zip code
from 2003 to 2012 (the shallow U shape reflects the fact that the numerator was
growing at a more or less constant rate of 3 percent per year, while the
denominator grew faster than nominator prior to 2008 and slower after or in
many cases actually fell). Clearly the difference between zip codes is greater than
the difference within codes, although how clear may not be apparent until you
see the next figure). Consequently, it follows that most of the departures from
assessment quality wrought by Measure 50 resulted from the rollback and not
from post-enactment price movements.
This conclusion is reinforced when we look directly
at the variance in the ratio of all TAVs to RMV and the
coefficient of dispersion (CD) over time. Again, the bottom line is that assessment
quality didn’t degrade very much between 2003 and 2012 (the period for which we
have data in individual residences). The standardized variance was 20 percent
in 2003 and 22.5 percent in 2008; it deteriorated only a little faster after
2008, to >27 percent in 2012, Price depreciation has evidently been slightly
more uneven than the earlier appreciation, when a rising tide did apparently
lift all boats. Using the CD, assessment quality declined overall from 14
percent in 2003, to 18 percent in 2008 and 22.5 percent in 2012. Even so,
overall assessment quality in Oregon is not measurably worse by this standard than
it was prior to Measure 5 and is much better than in many earlier periods.
Moreover, looking at Multnomah County, the within zip
code CDs are remarkably consistent over time and reflect good assessment quality.
Across all zip codes, 1997 CDs explain 2/3 of the variation in 2012 CDs. The actual
CDs ranged across zip codes from four percent to 26.3 percent in 1997 and from
5.7 percent to 25.7 in 2012. In 1997, CDs in two of 31 zip codes exceeded 15
percent, the standard established by the National Association of Real Estate Appraisers;
by 2012 that standard was topped by only five.
The box and whiskers chart (above) shows the mean
(the solid bar), the standard deviation (the box), and the range (the whiskers)
of residential assessment ratios for each year from 2003 to 2012. Clearly,
there was a fair amount of dispersion in assessments and, apparently, after
2008, the dispersion increased. One of the questions raised by this observation
is whether or not assessments favor one class of residences or another. The
Multnomah zip-code data tell us that there are substantial neighborhood
effects. Does this imply, for example, that deviations from mean assessment
ratios were or are biased in favor of high or perhaps low-value residences?
Property appraisers use an instrument called the price-related differential (PRD)
to measure this bias. A PRD equal to 1 indicates no bias; a PRD greater than 1
indicates a bias in favor of higher valued properties. From 2003 to 2010, the
PRD was slightly less than 1 (.98 to .99); in 2011 and 2012, slightly greater
than 1 (1.006, 1.014). This shift can be seen in the following figure; the
assessment ratios of residences in the lowest quartile of value started lower
or faster than did those in the higher value quartiles; more recently they have
evidently lost value faster.
Note this does not necessarily mean that the owners
of low-valued residences face significantly higher effective tax rates (where
property taxes are concerned, the effective tax rate is found by dividing the
tax bill by RMV) than the owners of higher valued properties. This is because
more than half of the owners of low-value residences (the first quartile) are
now subject to Measure 5 tax limits. In absolute terms, some have even seen a
decrease in their tax bills as the result of Measure 5 tax compression.