Editor's Note: I really can't give any prognosis for how soon this moribund blog will recover. It has been a pretty stressful time in the Emerson household and this blog has had to take a back seat. Fortunately, we have the sagacity of Fred Thompson to warm our hearts and stimulate our brains in my absence.
Take it away Fred:
Property taxes are fair and efficient only where there is a
reasonable relationship between tax payments and property wealth. Severing that
link renders their incidence both arbitrary and capricious. Oregon has a one-off
property tax system, which emphasizes stable growth in tax assessments and
payments and inter-jurisdictional uniformity in tax rates. On balance this
system has probably been good for Oregonians.
However, it has one feature that is not entirely likeable:
assessments are not readjusted to realign tax payments with property values.
Consequently, those that are out of step with their neighbors tend to drift
ever farther apart over time. Figure 1 shows the assessment ratios (assessed
value/market value) of 14 houses along one side of a block in Portland’s
Alberta Development District last year. This is clearly an extreme example, but
when the current system of property tax assessment went into effect, assessment
ratios within neighborhoods tended to be closely bunched together. This is
increasingly not the case.
Figure 1: An Extreme Example of
Neighborhood Dispersion
How serious is this problem? How misaligned are tax payments
and property values, is the misalignment getting worse, and, if so, how much?
To answer these questions for one jurisdiction, my colleague,
Robert Walker,
and I, regressed tax bills on market values for every residence in Portland for
each of the years 2003-2012. In this analysis the coefficient of
correlation (R
2) shows the strength of the relationship between
property wealth and tax payments: the higher the R
2 the stronger the
relationship (according to professional assessment standards, an R
2 less
than .80 is unsatisfactory). The regression coefficient shows how tax bills
change as a result of changes in property value. If greater than 1, a 1% change
in in property value is associated with an increase in the tax bill of more
than 1%; less than 1, an increase of less than 1%. As a general rule, the
greater the misalignment between property wealth and tax bills over time, the
greater the likelihood that low-valued properties will be hit with relatively
higher tax bills than high-valued properties.
Figure 2 shows what happened in Portland. The results for
2003 and 2004 are for the whole city; for 2005 through 2012, the city is
divided at the Willamette, owing to the adoption of a higher statutory tax rate
on the Westside of the river.
Figure 2: How Tax Bills Vary with
House Prices, Portland
What Figure 2 shows is that, on the Westside of Portland,
the relationship between property values and tax bills remains reasonably
strong, although the trend appears to be downward. On the Eastside, more homes
started off out of step with their neighbors and, over time, have drifted ever
farther apart.
We don’t want to overstate the dimensions of the problem: it
is real, but even on the Eastside, the misalignment is not huge, on average,
and, while it is growing worse, it is doing so at a fairly slow rate.
Nevertheless, the direction of change is unmistakable and the longer we go
without fixing this problem, the more costly and unpleasant the fix will be.
Cognizant of this problem, the
League
of Oregon Cities has
proposed
that property tax assessments be “reset” whenever a home is sold, which would
instantly stop the growth in misalignment and, over time, reduce it to a stable
and acceptable level (see below).
This fairly straightforward proposal has triggered a surprising
amount of opposition. The
Oregonian’s editors claim that it
would supercharge tax collections and create new inequities: “People who’d just
bought homes would resent, with good reason, neighbors who’d owned their homes
for a long time.” Bill Sizemore agrees, adding that, compared with the current
system in which
assessed
value does not change when a home is sold, “
adjusting assessed values to sales prices creates far worse
inequities. This has been well documented. Our system may allow …
inequities …, but adjusting values at the time of sale creates gross inequities
between next door neighbors.” The
Oregonian’s
Erik Lukens concludes, “this is a classic ‘tax the other guy’ proposal that
taxpayers likely will regret. There are problems with the property tax system …
but this isn't a very good solution.”
Are the critics correct? As is usually the case, it helps to
look at the numbers, not merely a few illustrative cases. Using our Portland
data, we can estimate what would have happened to property taxes if assessments
had been reset whenever a title transaction occurred and recalculate the R2s
from the previous exercise. We have performed this analysis using two different
reset standards: setting assessed value equal to real market value, as
initially proposed by the League of Oregon Cities, and setting it equal to
market value multiplied by the ‘changed property ratio’ (CPR), as proposed by
several county assessors. (CPR is a county’s mean assessment ratio, i.e., the
assessed value of all the properties in the county of a given property class
divided by the real market value of those properties. This procedure is used
throughout Oregon and is currently applied to all newly built properties and major
improvements.)
What this analysis shows is that resetting assessed value to
real market value each time a sale occurred would increase 2012 R2s
on the Westside from .89 to .93, on the Eastside from .71 to .84, and total
annual property tax collections 11.4%. In other words, contrary to Sizemore’s
claims, the inequities would be substantially less on average, on both sides of
town and overall, than under the current system. However, this proposal would
also, as the Oregonian alleges,
significantly boost property tax payments. In contrast, reassessment using the CPR
increases the Westside R2 to .95, the Eastside to .89, and total
property tax revenues by less than 2%. This appears to be an altogether fairer,
less objectionable way to go.