Showing posts with label Corruption. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Corruption. Show all posts

Monday, April 25, 2011

Combatting Corruption

Kaushik Basu, the chair of my dissertation committee in graduate school and now Chief Economic Advisor, Ministry of Finance, Government of India (coincidence? I don't think so...) which is essentially the same role as the Chair of the Council of Economic Advisors in the US has written an academic paper on combatting corruption.  what is interesting about it is this: here he is in a policy role and he is taking seriously the part economic theory, applied to real problems, can play in shaping and improving policy.

As a member of a nascent policy school, I think this is a greatly neglected endeavor.  The currency empirical study takes in policy is exaggerated at the cost of theory.  Without good theory there are no good empirics.

Anyway, here is Basu explaining in simple terms the very straightforward was policy can be altered to alter the incentives and combat corruption in India:

I recently wrote a paper suggesting a way to cut down corruption. This is of course a large problem and, while we must work against the whole gamut of it, waiting to solve the whole problem must not become an alibi for doing nothing. It was with this in mind that I proposed one way of reducing one class of bribery: “harassment bribes”, defined as bribes that ordinary people often have to pay to get what is rightfully theirs, such as when a person’s income tax refund or driving license is held back, with all formalities completed, till she agrees to grease palms. Such bribes are just a segment of the large problem of corruption, but they are by no means negligible. For ordinary citizens, these are often the most ubiquitous forms of harassment at the hands of officialdom. My suggestion was that, for such crimes, we must not treat the ordinary citizen, who is the victim of this practice, on par with the official who takes the bribe, as our current law does. In particular, we should not punish the bribe giver but should instead make the penalty stiffer for the bribe taker and also require him to return the bribe. My belief is that if we make this kind of an amendment to India’s Prevention of Corruption Act 1988, there will be a sharp decrease in bribery. This is because it will now be in the interest of the bribe giver to get the official who took the bribe caught. Knowing this, there will be much greater reluctance on the part of officials to take bribes.

Soon after the British in India declared sati a crime, they went on to declare witnessing sati also a crime. Is there any surprise that the courts seldom found any witnesses for sati?
In today’s India, where, at last, there is public stirring to bring these pernicious practices to an end by drafting new laws, I wanted to make a small contribution to the debate by drawing on my own expertise. And the reaction to my paper has been heartening beyond measure in the media, domestic and international. But what really pleases me is the hand-written letters I have got from ordinary people thanking me for suggesting that they be not treated as criminals on par with those who forced them to pay a bribe.

It is really a tribute to India that we can discuss and debate such touchy topics in public and with transparency. There are few places outside of a handful of industrialized nations where this is possible.

The reason I am summarizing my paper is that I am saddened by two or three vicious articles that appeared in the last few days turning my argument on its head and trying to silence the debate instead of participating in it. I do not know if this is done with some vested interest or simply from a failure to understand what I was saying. Hence, this second attempt. There are some responses to my article which, whether or not they agree with my main proposal, are well-argued, show respect for the Indian reader and join the discussion in the spirit in which I wrote in the first place (see Indian Express and Business World of April 23, for instance).

These require a more thought-through response but that will have to wait.
For now, let me just add what I have said before in public: one reason I refuse to partake in the debate about whether corruption enhances or thwarts growth is my view that corruption should be considered unacceptable in a civilized society no matter what it does to growth. In my life as an economic adviser nothing distresses me more than the news breaks on corruption that we get ever so often. Our citizens deserve better.

Kaushik Basu
24 April 2011

Here is the paper itself. Here is some political blowback.

Friday, February 19, 2010

Economist's Notebook: Corruption



Over at the World Bank's blog site comes this interesting tidbit about efforts to control corruption in India. Students of development know that the two main areas of focus in development are increasing human capital and the building of stronger institutions.  The term institutions refers to everything from the rule of law to the protection of private property rights to effective bureaucracies and the control of corruption.  These are all combined into one because they all have huge impacts on both the amount and effectiveness of private investment as well as the efficient and effective governance of the economy.

Corruption is one of the big symptoms of ineffective and weak institutions and is considered a major obstacle to growth.  But how to combat it when it is so entrenched in many societies - so much so that it is often considered part of the legitimate compensation for a public sector job - is an open question.

Here is one novel response.  A group called 5th pillar in India has distributed the zero rupee note with the idea that when a public official asks for a bribe for something that is supposed to be provided at no charge, you hand them the zero rupee note as a form of protest.  In other words it is a consumer driven approach to combating corruption.  But how it is really supposed to work is not clear to me.

This excerpt from the blog provides some explanation:

Anand explained that a number of factors contribute to the success of the zero rupee notes in fighting corruption in India. First, bribery is a crime in India punishable with jail time. Corrupt officials seldom encounter resistance by ordinary people that they become scared when people have the courage to show their zero rupee notes, effectively making a strong statement condemning bribery. In addition, officials want to keep their jobs and are fearful about setting off disciplinary proceedings, not to mention risking going to jail. More importantly, Anand believes that the success of the notes lies in the willingness of the people to use them. People are willing to stand up against the practice that has become so commonplace because they are no longer afraid: first, they have nothing to lose, and secondly, they know that this initiative is being backed up by an organization—that is, they are not alone in this fight.

This last point—people knowing that they are not alone in the fight—seems to be the biggest hurdle when it comes to transforming norms vis-à-vis corruption. For people to speak up against corruption that has become institutionalized within society, they must know that there are others who are just as fed up and frustrated with the system. Once they realize that they are not alone, they also realize that this battle is not unbeatable. Then, a path opens up—a path that can pave the way for relatively simple ideas like the zero rupee notes to turn into a powerful social statement against petty corruption.

It seems to me that after a while no one will care that you hand them a zero rupee note, but maybe I am wrong.